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Abstract
This paper explores the role of life expectancy as a determinant of educational attainment and
fertility, both during the demographic transition and after its completion. Two points distinguish
our analysis from the previous ones. First, together with the investments of parents in the human
capital of children, we introduce investments of adult individuals in their own education, which
determines productivity in the goods and household sectors. Second, we let child mortality and
adult longevity aﬀect the way parents value each individual child. Increases in adult longevity
eventually raise the investments in adult education. Together with the higher utility derived from
each child, this tilts the quantity-quality trade oﬀ towards less and better educated children, and
increases the growth rate of the economy. Reductions in child mortality may have similar eﬀects.
The setup is consistent with the demographic transition and the recent behavior of fertility and
educational attainment in “post-demographic transition” countries.
1 Introduction
Major demographic changes swept the world in the course of the last century. Life expectancy at
birth rose from 40 years to more than 70 years. Total fertility rates plummeted from around 6
points to close to 2 points or below. Today, over 60 countries, comprising almost 50% of the world
population, have fertility rates below replacement level (2.1), and the vast majority of people
lives in countries where population is expected to stabilize within the next ﬁfty years (Robinson
and Srinivasan, 1997). Furthermore, several developed countries have experienced increasingly
low fertility levels. These include Austria, Canada, Greece, Japan, and Spain, all of which have
fertility rates below 1.5. In short, recent reductions in fertility do not seem to be restricted to
experiences of demographic transition. Time and again, developed countries, believed to have
ﬁnished their transition long ago, experienced increasingly low fertility levels.
This phenomenon, largely overlooked both empirically and theoretically, points to the necessity
of understanding the recent behavior of fertility from a more general perspective, not restricted
to the demographic transition. The goal of this paper is to analyze the role of life expectancy
1gains, determined from technical developments in health technologies, as the driving force behind
the changes in fertility, educational attainment, and growth observed during the process of de-
mographic transition and thereafter1 . The major role attributed to mortality in the empirical
literature on the demographic transition suggests that life expectancy changes are an independent
driving force.2 This idea is further supported by the striking stability of the cross-sectional
relationship between life expectancy, fertility and schooling, as opposed to the changing relation-
ship between income and these same demographic variables (this evidence is discussed in detail in
Section 2). In this paper, we look at how changes in child mortality and adult longevity aﬀect the
incentives of individuals to have children and to invest in education, and what the consequences
of these changes are to the process of economic development. Changes in life expectancy can help
explain the reductions in fertility that characterize the demographic transition, and the changes
in demographic variables that accompany economic growth.
Extensive work has been done in the last decade on the determinants of fertility, and the
relation between fertility and investments in human capital. A large part of this literature tries to
explain the demographic transition as a consequence of increased investments in human capital due
to technological change (Azariadis and Drazen,1990; Galor and Weil, 1996, 1999, and 2000; Hansen
and Prescott, 1998; and Tamura, 1996).3 A second strand of literature analyzes how changes in
child mortality aﬀect fertility decisions, occasionally incorporating investments of parents in the
human capital of children (Blackburn and Cipriani, 1998; Boldrin and Jones, 2002; Ehrlich and
Lui, 1991; Kalemli-Ozcan, 1999; Kalemli-Ozcan , Ryder, and Weil, 2000; Meltzer, 1992; Momota
and Fugatami, 2000; and Tamura, 2001).
This paper improves upon this literature by stressing the importance of distinguishing between
child and adult mortalities, and by explicitly incorporating adult investments in human capital.
This allows the model to address the recent phenomenon of small and decreasing fertility in
developed countries, ignored by the literature cited here and incompatible with most of its results.
In addition, it extends the analysis to explain the observed behavior of educational attainment, and
reveals the potential importance of adult longevity in determining the evolution of the economy
after the demographic transition.
Two assumptions distinguish our model from the previous ones. First, we let child mortality
1 The direct welfare implications of the gains in life expectancy, and their impact on the evolution of cross-country
inequality, are discussed in Becker, Philipson and Soares (2003), and Philipson and Soares (2002).
2 See, for example, Heer and Smith (1968), Cassen (1978), Kirk (1996), Mason (1997), and Macunovich (2000).
In short, the view is that “if there is a single or principal cause of fertility decline, it is reasonable to ascribe it to
falls in mortality, which was the major cause of destabilization” (Kirk, 1996, p.379).
3 Galor and Weil (1999) mention that reductions in mortality could increase investments in human capital and
reduce fertility via the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ, but they do not develop the idea formally.
2and adult longevity aﬀect the way in which parents value each individual child, in much the same
way that number of children does in the traditional literature. This assumption incorporates
the idea that parents care about number of children surviving into adulthood, and extends it to
later ages. Once one considers that individuals are not only concerned with the survival of their
children, but also with the continuing survival of their whole lineage, this is a natural assumption.
Speciﬁcally, we draw on the evolutionary biology literature and assume that the utility that parents
derive from each child depends on the number of children, the child mortality rate, and the lifetime
that each child will enjoy as an adult. Acknowledging the importance of mortality to the way in
which parents value each child has important consequences in terms of fertility choices.
Second, we incorporate explicitly the distinction between investment of parents’ in the human
capital of children and investment of adult individuals in their own human capital. This generates
direct predictions about educational attainment and helps distinguish between the economic im-
pacts of changes in adult and child mortality. This approach is also more realistic and brings the
theory closer to the empirical accounts that justify the impacts of life expectancy on educational
investments (see, for example, the discussion on rates of return in Meltzer, 1992).
These two assumptions play central roles in the mechanics of the model. Brieﬂy, increases in
adult longevity eventually raise the investments in education, which increase the productivity of
individuals both in the labor market and in the household sector. Also, higher life expectancy
tilts the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ towards less and better educated children and tends to move
the economy out of a “Malthusian” equilibrium.4 Once the economy abandons the “Malthusian”
regime, increases in adult longevity reduce fertility, increase educational attainment, and increase
the growth rate of the economy (or the steady state level of consumption). Reductions in child
mortality may have similar eﬀects. This setup is consistent with the demographic transition
and with the recent behavior of fertility in “post-demographic transition” countries. In addition,
it reconciles theory with the evidence on the changing relationship between income and several
demographic variables.
Recent work suggests that individuals’ predictions of their own life expectancies are consid-
erably accurate, and react to exogenous events in consistent ways (see Hamermesh, 1985; Hurd
4 The issue of fertility choice in underdeveloped economies is controversial. Nevertheless, evidence shows that
there is always some margin of choice. Several kinds of actions taken in ‘pre-modern’ societies aﬀect fertility
outcomes, including marriage patterns, breast feeding habits, abortion, and sexual practices (see Demeney, 1979;
Caldwell, 1981; Kirk, 1996; and Mason, 1997).
In relation to health, although some actions taken at the individual level aﬀect mortality, our interest here is
f o c u s e do nt h eg a i n si nl i f ee x p e c t a n c yo b s e r v e di nt h el a st two centuries, which were largely due to scientiﬁca n d
technical developments. At the individual level, these were partly exogenous. These gains were also exogenous
to less developed countries, which experienced mortality reductions independent of improvements in economic
conditions. The gains in life expectancy in less developed countries are thought to be consequence of the absorption
of knowledge generated elsewhere and of the help provided by international aid programs (see Preston, 1975 and
1980; Kirk, 1996; and Becker, Philipson, and Soares, 2003).
3and McGarry, 1997; and Smith et al, 2001). Therefore, the role of life expectancy in explaining
changes in behavior may indeed be empirically relevant. Section 4 discusses evidence supporting
the idea that recent changes in life expectancy were largely independent of improvements in eco-
nomic conditions. In addition, it argues that the historical experiences of demographic transition
display patterns consistent with the predictions of the model. Life expectancy gains seem to be a
driving force behind the changes observed in the other variables.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 motivates the anal-
ysis by presenting a very simple but striking fact: while the cross-sectional relationship between
income and some key demographic variables (life expectancy, fertility, and schooling) has been
consistently shifting in the recent past, the relationship between life expectancy and fertility and
schooling has remained considerably stable. This observation suggests that there is a dimension
of changes in life expectancy that is not explained by material development (income), but that
seems to explain changes in fertility and educational attainment. Section 3 presents the model.
It starts by describing the structure of the model, and draws on the evolutionary biology litera-
ture to motivate the assumptions related to preferences for children. Following, it discusses the
eﬀects of changes in adult longevity and child mortality. Finally, it introduces the assumption of
decreasing returns to human capital, and shows that the only change it introduces in the model is
the elimination of long run growth. Under some normality conditions, results that previously held
for growth rates, in this case hold for income levels, and the behavior of demographic variables
remains unchanged. Section 4 discusses the causes of recent changes in mortality, the demographic
transition, and the behavior of fertility and educational attainment after the transition. The his-
torical evidence is consistent with the predictions and hypotheses of the model. The ﬁnal section
summarizes the main ﬁndings of the paper.
2 Recent Changes in Life Expectancy, Educational Attain-
ment, and Fertility
The growth literature usually looks at income as a variable either driving or summarizing all the
changes in relevant dimensions of development. In this perspective, gains in income per capita
improve nutrition and demand for health, which reduces mortality rates; income gains also change
the quantity-quality trade oﬀ in terms of number and education of children, which reduces fertility
and increases human capital investment. Statements like these are common, and it is fair to say
that they give an accurate description of the consensus regarding the main changes taking place
during the process of development.
This view, although right, does not give a complete picture of reality. Recently, the relation-
4ship between income and some key demographic variables — such as life expectancy, educational
attainment, and fertility — has been clearly unstable. Figures 1 to 3 plot the 1960 and 1995 cross
sectional relation between income per capita (GNP per capita in constant 1995 US$) and, respec-
tively, life expectancy at birth, total fertility rate, and average schooling in the population aged 25
and above.5 To concentrate on economies that share the same demographic regime, the ﬁgures
refer only to countries that had already started the demographic transition in 1960.6
Figure 1 shows that, for constant levels of income, life expectancy has been rising. This
phenomenon was ﬁrst noticed by Preston (1975), who analyzed data between 1930 and 1960.
For lower levels of income, life expectancy at birth has increased by more than ﬁve years in the
period between 1960 and 1995. This means, for example, that a country with GNP per capita of
US$5,000 in 1995 had life expectancy roughly 10% higher than a country with the same income
in 1960.
Figures 2 and 3 tell analogous stories for fertility and educational attainment. For constant
levels of income, fertility has been falling and educational attainment has been rising. Reductions
in fertility have been of up to 2 points for countries with per capita income around US$3,000.
Gains in average schooling have been usually over 1 year.
The ﬁgures illustrate that there is a dimension of change in these three demographic variables
that is not related to changes in income. It seems natural to ask whether the changes in life
expectancy, education, and fertility are related to each other. An insight in this direction is
gained by looking at the relation between life expectancy and the other two variables.
Figures 4 and 5 plot the 1960 and 1995 cross sectional relation between life expectancy and,
respectively, fertility and educational attainment. Figure 4 shows that the curves for life ex-
pectancy and fertility are close to two segments of a single nonlinear function that remains stable
throughout the period (portrayed as the darker line). This is even more obvious for the relation
between life expectancy and educational attainment. Figure 5 shows that the curves for these two
variables merge into each other for the region where observations for both periods exist. In both
cases, countries seem to be sliding through time on a stable curve.
5 The general results illustrated in Figures 1 to 5 do not depend on the speciﬁc statistics used, nor on the presence
of any particular country in the sample. Income, fertility and life expectancy are from the World Development
Indicators data set, and average schooling is from the Barro and Lee data set. Data are ﬁve-year averages centered on
the reference year. The concave curves ﬁtted to the data assume a logarithmic relation of the form y = α+β ln(x),
and the convex curves assume a power relation of the form y = αxβ. The curves in Figure 5 are third order
polynomials.
6 A more precise reason for restricting the sample is given in the theoretical section. Empirically, some objective
criterion deﬁning whether a country already started the demographic transition has to be chosen. Our choice is the
cutoﬀ point “countries that had life expectancy at birth above 50 years in 1960,” also to be justiﬁed later on. The
results do not depend on the speciﬁc criterion chosen, and the countries included are the ones commonly regarded
as having started the transition in the 1960’s or before.
5The evidence suggests that, for constant levels of income, life expectancy is rising, fertility is
declining, and educational attainment is increasing. At the same time, changes in fertility and
schooling are following very closely the changes in life expectancy. This has been happening in
such a way that, for given life expectancy, fertility and schooling have remained roughly constant.
In short, there is a dimension of change in life expectancy that is not associated with income,
but that seems to be associated with fertility and educational attainment. In addition, while
fertility and education are direct objects of individual choice, life expectancy has a large exogenous
component, related to scientiﬁc knowledge and technological development. This reasoning suggests
that exogenous reductions in mortality, together with a stable behavioral relationship between life
expectancy, educational attainment, and fertility, may be behind the observed changes. In what
follows, we develop a theory along these lines. Our goal is to explain the evidence discussed here,
together with the triggering of the demographic transition, as being determined by exogenous
gains in life expectancy.
3 The Model
3.1 Structure of the Model
Consider an economy inhabited by adult individuals who live for a deterministic amount of time.
Individuals invest in their own education, work, consume, have children, and invest in the educa-
tion of each child. The model is a “one-sex” model. We abstract from uncertainty considerations
to concentrate on the impact of adult longevity and child mortality on the direct economic incen-
tives at the individual level. To make the model treatable, we also abstract from physical capital.
Individuals, or households, have an endowed level of ‘basic’ human capital — determined from
previous generations’ decisions — based on which they decide on how much to invest in their own
‘adult’ education. Adult education determines productivity in the labor market and in the house-
hold sector. Households possess backyard technologies for producing adult human capital, goods,
and basic human capital, and they decide on how to allocate their time across these activities in
order to maximize utility.
Af r a c t i o nβ of the children born dies before reaching adulthood. Childhood is an instantaneous
phase: as soon as individuals are born they face the child mortality rate and, if survivors, become
adults. There is no decision to be made as a child. Adults live for T periods. They derive utility
f r o mt h e i ro w nc o n s u m p t i o ni ne a c hp e r i o do fl i f e(
c(t)σ
σ ), and from the children they have.
We adopt a paternalistic approach and assume that adults are concerned directly with the




α . The literature
on fertility usually assumes that the value that parents place on the human capital of each child
6is an increasing and concave function of the number of children. Since we incorporate longevity
and child mortality into the analysis, we also take into account the eﬀect of these variables. We
assume that, together with the number of children, parents also care about how long each child
will live, in such a way that the discount factor applied to children’s human capital is a function
ρ(n,T,β)o fn u m b e ro fc h i l d r e n( n), child mortality (β), and adult longevity (T). The function
ρ(n,T,β) is assumed be increasing and concave on n and T, and decreasing and concave on β.
Additionally, we assume that there is a tendency towards satiation in terms of number of children,
such that7 ρn(n,T,β) decreases rapidly as n increases, and eventually approaches zero. The
speciﬁc assumption is that ε(n,T,β)=
ρn(n,T,β)n
ρ(n,T,β) — the elasticity of the altruism function ρ in
relation to n — is decreasing, such that ρnn−(ρn/ρ)(ρn−ρ/n) < 0, and ρn(n,T,β)=0f o rn large
enough. This captures the idea that there are natural constraints to the bearing of children, and
it is biologically impossible for a woman to have an arbitrarily large number of children during her
reproductive life. Speciﬁc assumptions regarding the interaction of n, T,a n dβ inside ρ(n,T,β)
are very important in determining the behavior of fertility. This discussion is saved until the next
section.











where θ is the subjective discount rate, and 0 < σ,α < 1. The ﬁrst term denotes the utility that
parents derive from their own consumption, and the second term denotes the utility that they
derive from their children.8
Individuals face goods and time constraints: they have to allocate their total lifetime (T)
between working (l), raising children (b), and investing in their own education (e); and they have
to allocate their lifetime income (y) between their own consumption (c(t)p e rp e r i o d )a n dﬁxed
costs of having children (f). Borrowing from future generations and bequests are not allowed.
The time and goods constraints are given, respectively, by
7 Throughout the paper, fz(z) denotes the partial derivative of f(z)i nr e l a t i o nt oz. When the context is clear,
we save on notation by writing fz instead of fz(z).
8 Alternatively, if we assume that parents enjoy having children only to the extent that they share part of their
lifetime, and that adults have children at age τ, the second term in the expression has to be integrated over time
from τ to T, and discounted at the rate θ. Another possible variation of the model would distinguish between
parent’s adult longevity and children’s adult longevity. In this case, we could write Tp and Tc and analyze only
the impacts of changes in Tc. Since our focus is on the eﬀect of permanent, technologically induced, changes in β
and T, we do not make this distinction. In any case, both variations of the model deliver qualitative predictions
similar to the ones obtained here.




exp(−rt)c(t)dt +e x p ( −rτ)nf ,( 2 )
where r is the interest rate, and it is assumed that adults have children at age τ.9
Adult human capital (Hp) is produced with the basic human capital that parents had once they
entered adulthood (hp), and time invested in adult education (e). Once adult human capital is
accumulated, parents produce goods (or income) by using their stock of adult human capital (Hp)
and time (l). Adult human capital, together with time invested in children (b), also determines
the basic human capital that each child will inherit (hc). We assume that human capital and
time are complements in all production functions, such that adult human capital increases the
productivity of time in the labor market and in the household sector, and basic human capital
increases the productivity of education in generating adult human capital. Production functions
take on simple multiplicative forms, with constant returns to human capital:
Hp = Aehp + Ho,
hc = DbHp + ho, and (3)
y = lHp,
where D,A,Ho,h o are non-negative constants, and hp is given.10 In section 3.5, we consider the
implications of having decreasing returns to human capital in this model.
This setup distinguishes between basic and adult human capital: h denotes human capital
formed during childhood, in which parents can invest, related to basic education and skills, and
emotional development; H denotes human capital obtained during young adulthood, related,
for example, to college, graduate education, and professional training. The speciﬁcation of the
production functions takes into account the cumulative nature of the process of investment in
these diﬀerent forms of human capital. We assume that individuals enter adulthood with a given
level of basic human capital (hp), and then, by deciding on how much to invest in their own
9 In reality, part of the costs of having children should apply to children born, and part should apply to children
who survive into later ages. But the main economic eﬀect of child mortality comes from the wedge between
resources spent on children, and resources wasted due to mortality. Since distinguishing between expenditures on
children born and children surviving would greatly complicate the model, we maintain this formulation. In general,
specifying costs in terms of surviving children reduces the eﬀects of changes in child mortality, because in this case
it also aﬀects the cost of acquiring survivors.
10 There is no technological parameter in the production function of y because such parameter can be reabsorbed
v i ar e l a b e l i n go fA, D,a n dHp.
8education, choose a level of adult human capital (Hp). hc i st h el e v e lo fb a s i ch u m a nc a p i t a lt h a t
parents give to each of their children.11 Ho and ho denote the levels of adult and basic human
capital that individuals have, even in the absence of explicit investments in education. These can
be thought of as determined from innate skills and natural learning throughout life, as related to
communication, hunting and gathering, and primitive household production techniques.
To concentrate on the issues of interest, we depart from the general formulation and introduce
some simplifying assumptions. Since our main concern is the long run behavior of the economy,
particularly the inter-generational fertility and human capital decisions, we abstract from life cycle
considerations by assuming that subjective discount rates and interest rates equal zero. Given the
time-separability of the utility function, this implies constant consumption throughout life.












lHp > Tc+ fn. (5)
The full-income constraint is obtained by substituting for l in the budget constraint:
THp = Tc+ fn+( bn + e)Hp. (6)
Full lifetime income can be allocated between goods (Tc+ fn), time spent raising children, and
time spent investing in education, where the opportunity cost of time is given by its productive
value (Hp). The problem of the individual is to maximize 4 subject to 6 and to the production
functions in 3. This is the benchmark model that guides our discussion.
3.2 Preferences Over Fertility and Lifetime of Children
Two assumptions concerning the altruism function ρ are essential in the analysis. First, we assume
that parents care for the life expectancy of children, possibly including ages beyond reproduction.
Second, we assume that parents see number of children and lifetime of each child as substitutes, so
that increases in life expectancy reduce the marginal utility of number of children. It is common
to see these assumptions applied informally to discussions on child mortality, but their explicit
consideration and their extension to later ages are new to our approach.
11 To keep notation to a minimum, we are not indexing by generations, and are distinguishing parent’s and
children’s basic human capital by the subscripts p and c. These are obviously related across generations. If we let
i index diﬀerent generations, hi+1
p ≡ hi
c.
9We justify both assumptions with arguments from the evolutionary biology literature. In this
tradition, preferences today are inherited from the eﬀect of natural selection on two million years
of human history in hunter-gatherer societies (see discussion in Bergstrom, 1996; Robson, 2001
and 2002; and Robson and Kaplan, 2003). Within this context, preferences that maximized evolu-
tionary ﬁtness were the ones that eventually dominated and were inherited by current populations.
An obvious critique to the incorporation of adult longevity into preferences for children might
be that, from an evolutionary perspective, preferences over survival beyond reproductive ages
cannot be justiﬁed, since they do not aﬀect the reproductive success of individuals. But contrary to
this simplest biological view, ﬁtness does not depend exclusively on number of oﬀspring (fertility).
Beauchamp (1994), Robson (2001 and 2003), and Kaplan and Lancaster (2003), argue that ﬁtness
depends both on quantity and quality of oﬀspring. As ﬁtness refers to the continuing survival of the
lineage, ﬁtness maximization implies maximization of the long-term production of descendents.
N a t u r a ls e l e c t i o no no ﬀspring quantity and quality should maximize the number of oﬀspring
that survive to reproductive ages in conditions to reproduce, or, indirectly, the reproduction and
survival of later generations (Kaplan and Lancaster, 2003).
Particularly in human population, ﬁtness was also aﬀected by individuals’ survival into post-
reproductive ages (Robson and Kaplan, 2003; and Kaplan and Lancaster, 2003). This was the
case because hunter-gatherer life-style involved a dramatic intergenerational transfer of resources.
Given the slow process of human maturing — due to the biological formation of the brain in
early stages of life and long periods of learning-by-doing thereafter — children and adolescents
constituted a signiﬁcative drain on society, and their survival depended upon the production of
energy surplus by other members (mature adults). The evidence presented in Robson and Kaplan
(2003) suggests that, in hunter-gatherer societies, individuals only “repay” the entirety of their
energy debt when they are almost 50 years old. Although from a traditional perspective “it is even
mysterious why individuals should live beyond [reproductive] age, (...) the biological purpose of
this is clear: it is to provide resources to oﬀspring” (Robson and Kaplan, 2003, p.157). Without
food storage, preferences acknowledging the importance of oﬀspring’s survival to ages beyond
reproduction would guarantee this intergenerational transfer of resources in future generations,
and maximize ﬁtness in the long run.
This arguments asserts that preferences towards oﬀspring life expectancy should naturally
arise within a hunter-gatherer society, and that these preferences should eventually dominate the
population. The simple fact that post-reproductive longevity did represent a dimension of ﬁtness
implies that there is an evolutionary basis for preferences over adult life expectancy to arise. This
justiﬁes including both β and T inside the function ρ, and deals with the ﬁrst of our assumptions.
10The second assumption refers to the substitutability between number of children and lifetime of
each child.
The central idea is that there is a trade-oﬀ between quantity and quality of oﬀspring in de-
termining the ﬁtness of any evolutionary strategy. The simple fact that ﬁtness is determined
by both quantity and quality of oﬀspring, together with full use of resources, should imply such
trade-oﬀ. Smith and Fretwell (1974) discuss the analytical aspects of this trade-oﬀ in terms of the
maximization of ﬁtness.
Virtually all the papers cited above mention the importance of this quantity-quality trade-
oﬀ in determining the evolution of human preferences towards reproduction. Various examples
from other species corroborate the presence of this trade-oﬀ in nature. These include variation
in number of oﬀspring and post-natal care to each oﬀspring across diﬀerent species (Kaplan and
Lancaster, 2003), as well as variation in number of oﬀspring and diﬀerent dimensions of quality
within species. In a study on bird reproduction, Lack (1968) shows that there is a within species
trade-oﬀ between clutch size and egg size (or weight and survival of the newborn), and that this
trade-oﬀ is more intense for species with longer breeding periods. Smith and Fretwell (1974)
discuss evidence on a similar type of trade-oﬀ among mammalian species — including beavers,
chimpanzees, and humans — due to the reduction in the energy available to each oﬀspring as
parental care has to be spread out among diﬀerent litters.
Our assumption requires only the existence of this trade-oﬀ in nature, and the recognition
that adult longevity can be seen as an additional dimension of oﬀspring quality. The last part
of the argument follows immediately from the discussion in the previous paragraph, where we
argued that survival into adulthood aﬀected ﬁtness in earlier hunter-gatherer populations. In this
case, natural selection would impose a trade-oﬀ between life expectancy and number of oﬀspring
(fertility) that, if recognized by preferences, would imply a dominant evolutionary strategy. This
is the logic underlying a recent model developed by Robson (2003, section 3), in which preferences
regarding life expectancy and fertility as substitutes arise as ﬁtness maximizing and dominant in
the long run. In his model, life expectancy and fertility arise as substitutes for purely biological
reasons. But the sense in which they are substitutes in the induced preferences is exactly the
same that we will have here: exogenous increases in life expectancy reduce the marginal utility of
fertility.
I nt h er e m a i n d e ro ft h ep a p e r ,w ea s s u m et h a tp r e f erences determined by evolutionary forces —
throughout two million years of human life in a hunter-gatherer environment — were carried on to
the ten thousand years of modern history. These preferences are deﬁned over number of children
and lifetime of each child, and regard these variables as substitutes. Increases in adult longevity
11and reductions in child mortality reduce the marginal utility of fertility (ρnT(n,T,β) < 0a n d
ρnβ(n,T,β) > 0).
3.3 The Role of Adult Longevity
3.3.1 Static Implications of Longevity Gains
This section looks at the individual decision taking the initial level of basic human capital as
given (hp). Following, we discuss the implications of this decision process to the growth rate and
dynamic behavior of the economy, and look at the properties of an equilibrium with zero growth
and no investments in human capital.
Consider an equilibrium with growth. In this case, the parameters f, ho,a n dHo become
asymptotically irrelevant. Substituting for hc in the utility function and for Hp in the full-income





















where λ is the multiplier on the full-income constraint.






ρ(n,T,β) , the elasticity of the altruism function ρ in relation to fertility
(n). The expression above states that the agent will equate the elasticity of the altruism function
to the constant elasticity of the hc sub-utility: ε(n,T,β)=α.









ρn[ρnn − (ρn/ρ)(ρn − ρ/n)]
< 0, (12)
where the sign comes from the assumptions of decreasing elasticity of ρ in relation to n (εn < 0),12
and “substitutability” between n and T (ρnT < 0).
12 Decreasing elasticity of ρ in relation to n can be restated as “strong” concavity of the function ρ,i nt h es e n s e
that ρnn − (ρn/ρ)(ρn − ρ/n) < 0.
12The equalization of elasticities expressed in equation 11 comes from the fact that n and b enter
multiplicatively in the objective function (via the sub-utility functions) and the constraint. But
the simple expression obtained above hinges on the additional assumption of constant elasticity
for the hc sub-utility function. What this buys us is the independency of n in relation to all other
exogenous variables apart from T and β. With a more general speciﬁcation, hc would show up
in the right hand side of 11, and it would allow other exogenous variables to aﬀect the optimal
choice of n. But even in this case, the force working towards a negative relationship between n
and T would still be present, though possibly weakened by adjustments on hc.T h e i m p o r t a n t
point here is the presence of T in the altruism function ρ, and the way in which T and n interact
inside this function. This is the role played by the assumption that parents see number of children
and lifetime of each child as substitutes.13
Using equations 7, 9, and 10:
Ahpe2 = Tc+ Ahpebn, (13)
ρhc
α−1D = ncσ−1. (14)











Educational attainment increases with longevity. This should be expected, since increases in
longevity increase the period over which the returns from investments in education can be enjoyed.
Technological parameters, such as A and D, do not appear in expression 15 because they aﬀect
costs and beneﬁts of investments in education in symmetric ways.14 Although we see e here as a
measure of educational attainment, it can also be understood more generally as the specialization
of individuals in the social division of labor. In this sense, this result is analogous to the one
obtained by Becker (1985) and Becker and Murphy (1992), where increases in the total time
available for labor market activities increase specialization.
With expressions 12 and 15, we can use equations 13 and 14 to determine the eﬀect of exogenous
changes in T on c and b. Appendix A.1 shows that dc
dT and db
dT can be either positive or negative,
but they cannot be both negative at the same time. Either c or b must increase as T increases,
13 More generally, as long as we have a speciﬁcation where n and T have similar eﬀects on ε, in the sense that
sign{εn} = sign{εT}, the negative eﬀect of T on n (or positive eﬀect of β on n) will be obtained. This includes
t h ec a s ea s s u m e dh e r e( εn < 0a n dρnT < 0), but is not restricted to it.
14 This result is analogous to the one obtained by Ben-Porath (1967), regarding the eﬀect of the price of services
of human capital.
13and both may increase at the same time. This is obvious once we realize that an increase in T
also means an expansion in the constraint set. Since n goes down as T increases, and e increases
only proportionally to T, the additional resources have to be ‘consumed’ either via increased b or
increased c, and possibly both.
The speciﬁcs i g n so f dc
dT and db
dT depend on the values of the parameters, but the forces at work
can be understood by looking at the problem of the individual. We know that, as T increases, the
shadow price of the time b invested in hc (n) goes down, and the productivity of this investment
goes up (e), so that hc must increase in the new optimum, even though b itself may decrease.
Depending on the magnitude of the reduction in this shadow price, and on the concavity of the
sub-utility functions (σ and α), it will be worthwhile for the individual also to increase c together
with hc,o rt ol e tc decrease as hc increases.
It is easy to show that hc unequivocally increases as T rises. Since hc = ADhpbe,w eh a v et h a t
dhc
dT = ADhp(b de
dT + e db








2 (σ − 1)ncσ−2(T
2 + nb)]




where Ψ = cσ−1 − Dhα−1
c ρn − (σ − 1)ncσ−2Ahp
b
2 > 0 (see Appendix for proof).
It may seem counter-intuitive that c may actually go down as T increases, but it is important
to keep in mind exactly what this theoretical experiment corresponds to. Here, we analyze an
increase in T holding constant the level of basic human capital of parents (hp). The result means
that individuals entering adulthood that face a permanent increase in longevity will increase their
own education and the basic education that they give to their children. And it may be the case
that they reduce their own consumption in each period in order to be able to invest more in the
children’s human capital. This is diﬀerent from analyzing what the eﬀect of T on the consumption
pattern across generations will be. As we will see now, the model predicts that increases in T
increase the growth rate of consumption across generations.
3.3.2 Dynamic Implications of Longevity Gains
In order for a steady-state to exist in this economy, preferences have to be homothetic over c and
hc. This guarantees that, as the economy grows, individuals from diﬀerent generations will make
optimal decisions such that c and hp will grow at the same constant rate, and b, n, e,a n dl will
be constant. In our set up, this is equivalent to imposing the condition σ = α (see Appendix A.2
for discussion).15
15 The existence of a steady-state is not essential. Nevertheless, it greatly simpliﬁes the discussion. A formal
analysis of the condition σ = α and of the consequences of deviating from this assumption is contained in Appendix
A.2.
14Assuming that this condition holds, the production function of hc implies that the growth rate
of basic human capital is given by16 (1 + γ)=hc
hp = DAbe. From the goods constraint, we have
that Ahple = Tc, which implies that, in steady-state, c will grow at the same rate of hp.T h e
same will be true for the level of adult human capital (Hp), as can be seen from Hp = Aehp.













where the sign comes from the fact thatdhc
dT > 0. Longevity gains increase the steady-state growth
rates of consumption and all forms of human capital across generations.
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i sr e s u l ti sa sf o l l o w s .A sl o n g e v i t yi n c r e a s e s ,i n c e n t i v e st oi n v e s ti na d u l t
human capital increase, so that e — the amount of time devoted to parent’s own education, or
the educational attainment — increases. Once educational attainment and adult human capital
(Hp) are higher, the individual becomes more productive in investing in children’s human capital.
The higher life span of each child also tilts the quantity-quality trade oﬀ t o w a r d sl e s sa n db e t t e r
educated children, which reduces fertility. Together with the higher adult productivity in the
household sector, this increases the level of basic human capital given to each child. Higher basic
human capital, and more investments in adult education (higher educational attainment), end up
increasing the growth rate of the economy.
The goal of this section is to stress the role played by adult longevity, through changes in the
return to education and the way parents value each child, in the fertility and educational choices.
Our approach shows that, under reasonable conditions, longevity gains can reduce fertility, increase
educational attainment, and increase the growth rate of the economy.
3.3.3 The Malthusian Equilibrium
The model can also accommodate a so called Malthusian equilibrium, where investment in all
forms of human capital are at corner solutions and fertility varies positively with consumption and
production. This allows the characterization of the fertility transition as a natural consequence of
the escape from this steady-state, caused by successive increases in adult longevity.
We reincorporate the goods ﬁxed cost of children (f) and the lower bound levels of basic
and adult human capital (ho and Ho). In an equilibrium with consumption and all forms of
human capital growing, these constant terms become irrelevant, and all conclusions discussed in
t h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o nh o l d .B u ti na ne q u i l i b r i u mw i t hz e r og r o w t ha n dn oi n v e s t m e n ti nh u m a n
16 If DAbe < 1, there is no growth in steady-state. In this case, Ho and ho will be important in determining the
human capital and consumption levels in equilibrium.
15capital, these elements play a key role.
A Malthusian equilibrium is a situation where hp = ho, and the optimal choice of the individual























We call this corner solution a Malthusian equilibrium because, in a situation like this, changes
in productivity are positively related to changes in both consumption and fertility. Changes in
productivity can be brought about, for example, by exogenous changes in Ho.U s i n gt h eﬁrst two



























T (σ − 1)cσ−2
> 0.
Fertility and consumption respond positively to exogenous increases in productivity. With a
minor modiﬁcation, this setup can display all the features of a Malthusian regime, including its
“positive checks” mechanism and the constant long run consumption level. In order to achieve
that, we must incorporate the assumption of decreasing returns to population (scarcity of land)
into the model. Deﬁning P as aggregate population, this can be done by substituting Ho by some
function F(Ho,P), with FHo(Ho,P) > 0a n dFP(Ho,P) < 0. As before, changes in Ho capture
exogenous shocks to productivity, while FP(Ho,P) < 0 captures decreasing marginal product in
the agriculture sector. For given Ho, average productivity decreases with total population.
This formulation implies that the beneﬁts of exogenous gains in Ho are ‘exhausted’ in the long
run by the increased population generated by higher fertility. With time, n returns to its long run
equilibrium — constant population, such that (1 − β)n = 1 — which pins down the long run value
of consumption. There are no long run improvements in living standards, and population grows
only to the extent allowed by exogenous technological or natural shocks (changes in Ho). This
modiﬁcation of the model captures all the properties of what is known as a Malthusian regime,
b u tt ok e e pt h i n g ss i m p l ew ea n a l y z et h ec a s ew h e r eF(Ho,P)=Ho.
While the corner solution holds, changes in T will be associated with changes in c and n only.


































α + f2(σ − 1)cσ−2
> 0.
Increases in longevity increase consumption and have an ambiguous eﬀect on fertility. The am-
biguous eﬀect on fertility is due to the substitutability between T and n, and the absence of
investments in human capital in this equilibrium. The “income” eﬀect from the increased T tends
to increase fertility, but the “substitution” eﬀect (ρnT < 0) tends to reduce it. At low levels of
income (or consumption), the income eﬀect — ﬁrst term in the numerator of dn/dT —t e n d st ob e
larger in absolute value, so that dn/dT > 0. We assume this to be the case in the Malthusian
equilibrium.
While stuck in this equilibrium, increases in longevity are associated with increases in fertility
and consumption. But as T keeps growing, incentives to invest in both adult and basic human
capital increase, so that the inequalities characterizing the Malthusian equilibrium are eventually
broken. This is clear from the foc’s. The two inequalities characterizing corner solutions on e and
b can be written, respectively, as: ThoA/Ho < 1a n dε(n,T,β) > αDf/ho.A sT rises, the ﬁrst
inequality is eventually broken, so that individuals start investing in adult human capital. Also,
as T rises, and n rises in response to it, ρ increases and ε is reduced, so that the second inequality
also tends to be broken, and individuals start investing in their children’s basic human capital.
The intuition for the escape from the Malthusian regime is the following. As adult longevity
increases, returns from investment in adult education also rise, because of the longer period over
which education is productive. If gains in adult longevity are large enough, parents start investing
in their own education (e>0). In addition, as adult longevity gains take place, fertility rises.
Generally, depending on the properties of ρ, it could be the case that fertility would grow indeﬁ-
nitely and the corner solution on b would never be broken. The role played by the assumption that
the elasticity of ρ is reduced as n increases is exactly to guarantee that, for n and T suﬃciently
large, fertility will stop increasing and investments in children’s human capital will be undertaken
(b>0). If this assumption holds, and the minimum value of ε is not bounded above αDf/ho,
suﬃciently large adult longevity can always guarantee positive investments in adult and basic
human capital (b and e>0). After this threshold is reached, further increases in longevity trigger
the demographic transition, and the economy moves to a sustained growth path. Appendix A.3.1
proves these claims.
When this transition happens, the economy enters in the dynamic process described in the
17previous sections, where consumption and human capital grow from one generation to the next,
and fertility declines with further increases in longevity. In this case, the only engine behind the
demographic transition and the escape from the Malthusian steady-state is the exogenous change
in longevity. In the next section, we show that reductions in child mortality can play a similar
role, though some diﬀerences exist.
3.4 The Role of Child Mortality
3.4.1 Child Mortality in the Equilibrium with Growth
We start by analyzing the static implications of child mortality reductions, and then discuss its
eﬀects on the growth rate of the economy and the possibility of escape from the Malthusian steady-
state. First order conditions are given by equations 7 to 10, plus the constraint. The derivation








ρn[ρnn − (ρn/ρ)(ρn − ρ/n)]
> 0. (20)
Remember that β refers to the mortality rate, so that ρβ < 0, ρnβ > 0, and reductions in child
mortality are represented by reductions in β.
Investments in adult human capital depend only on adult longevity (e = T/2), which implies
de





















b + Ahp(σ − 1)n2cσ−2
> 0.
In addition, since hc = DAhpeb,w eh a v edhc
dβ = DAhpe db
dβ < 0.
In an equilibrium with growth, reductions in child mortality reduce fertility, increase invest-
ments in basic human capital, and leave adult educational attainment unchanged (so that hc
will increase). Parents’ consumption is reduced in order to enhance investments in basic human
capital.
The growth rate of the economy is given by (1 + γ)=DAeb.S o
d(1+γ)
dβ = DAe db
dβ < 0.
Increases in child mortality reduce the steady-state growth rate of the economy, via reductions in
investments in basic human capital.
In this case, all eﬀects of child mortality work through fertility. As child mortality decreases
a n df e r t i l i t yi sr e d u c e d ,r e s o u r c e sa r ef r e e du pt ob eu s e de i t h e ri np r o d u c i n gc or hc.B u t t h e
18reduction in n also reduces the shadow price of hc in relation to c, and increases the marginal
utility of hc (via ρ), such that hc is increased (via b), and consumption is reduced.
3.4.2 Child Mortality and the Malthusian Equilibrium
The Malthusian equilibrium is characterized by the foc’s discussed in section 3.3.3. The corner
solutions on e and b can be written, respectively, as TAho/Ho < 1a n dε(n,T,β) >
αDf
ho .F r o m




























α ρnn + f2(σ − 1)cσ−2
< 0.
Since child survival and fertility are substitutes, increases in child mortality lead to increases
in the number of children. As β does not aﬀect the resources constraint, increases in fertility take
place at the expenses of reductions in consumption.
With a general function ρ, it is possible that reductions in child mortality end up reducing
the total utility derived from children (after the adjustments in n) .B u tt h er e a l i s t i cc a s ei st h e
one where reductions in child mortality lead unequivocally to increased utility from children (see
discussion in Appendix A.3.2). In this case, reductions in child mortality — followed by reductions
in fertility — lead to increases in ρ and reductions in ε, increasing the return to investments in
children. At ﬁrst, as child mortality is reduced, investments in basic human capital are undertaken,
but nothing happens to investments in adult human capital (ﬁrst inequality). Only after basic
human capital is accumulated from one generation to the next, incentives to invest in adult
education rise (as hp grows in TAh p/Ho < 1). If child mortality reductions are large enough,
the economy leaves the Malthusian equilibrium, and moves into a steady-state with growth and
p o s i t i v ei n v e s t m e n t si nh u m a nc a p i t a l . T h e s ec l a i m sa r ep r o v e da n dd i s c u s s e di nd e t a i li nt h e
Appendix A.3.2.
3.5 Decreasing Returns to Human Capital
Throughout the paper we assume constant returns to human capital. This hypothesis is essential
in generating long run growth in the equilibrium with positive investments in human capital,
b u ti td o e sn o ta ﬀect the responses of fertility and educational attainment to changes in adult
longevity and child mortality. With decreasing returns to human capital, most of our results
19remain unchanged, and, under some normality conditions, the results that previously applied to
growth rates now apply to income levels.
In the Malthusian regime, the economy is characterized by the absence of investments in human
capital. In addition, the escape from such equilibrium depends only on the marginal returns to
human capital. So the behavior of the economy in the Malthusian equilibrium is not be aﬀected
by the speciﬁc shape of the human capital production function. Therefore, we concentrate the
discussion on the equilibrium with positive investments in human capital. In this section, we
introduce decreasing returns to human capital in the model and analyze its impact on the long
run behavior of the economy.
Since there are two types of human capital in the model, decreasing returns can be introduced
in diﬀerent ways. We choose the simplest one, which is also the most basic, in the sense that the
decreasing returns are transmitted throughout the diﬀerent uses of human capital.
As before, assume that adult human capital is produced with basic human capital and time
invested in education. But now consider the case where there are decreasing returns to basic
human capital, such that Hp = Aehφ
p,w h e r e0< φ < 1. These decreasing returns are transmitted
to other household technologies in the sense that hc = DbHp = ADbehφ
p and y = lHp = Alehφ
p.
This modelling choice is the most convenient one because, from the perspective of an individual
entering adulthood with given hp, the problem remains unchanged. Following the same steps
discussed in section 3.3, it is easy to show that two main results still hold: ε(n,T,β)=α and
e = T/2. This means that increases in adult longevity increase educational attainment and
reduce fertility, and reductions in child mortality reduce fertility. Results related to b, c,a n d
hc, conditional on hp, are also the same. In particular, d(eb)/dT > 0a n ddb/dβ < 0, such that
dhc/dT > 0a n ddhc/dβ < 0.
The diﬀerence lies in the long run behavior of basic human capital. As hc = ADbehφ
p,a n dt h e
steady state implies constant e and b, there is no possibility of long run growth. Asymptotically,
the economy converges to a constant level of basic human capital (hc = hp), given by h∗ =
(ADb∗e∗)1/(1−φ), where the asterisk denotes steady state. This immediately implies constant
adult human capital and consumption in the long run.






































Increases in adult longevity or reductions in child mortality lead to increases in the long run
stock of all forms of human capital. In the case of adult longevity, this happens mainly because
of higher educational attainment, though investments in children may also increase. In the case
of child mortality, it happens exclusively because of higher investments in children.
In equilibrium, consumption is given by
c∗ = H∗ l
T























































Theoretically, both expression can be either positive or negative, depending on the speciﬁc
s h a p eo fp r e f e r e n c e s . B u tt h er e a l i s t i cc a s ei st h eo n ew h e r ei n c r e a s e si na d u l tl o n g e v i t yo r
reductions in child mortality lead to increases in the long run level of consumption. As long as
the total amount of time spent raising children (nb) decreases as fertility is reduced, which is the
empirically relevant case, we have dc∗
dT > 0a n ddc∗
dβ < 0. In fact, even less is needed for the case
of changes in adult longevity: as long as the elasticity of the total amount of time spent raising
children in relation to longevity is not above unit, gains in longevity lead to increases in long run
consumption.
Increased female participation in the labor market is probably the most obvious evidence of
reduced demand for total time spent on children as fertility is reduced, even though time spent
per child may well increase. In this case, the model with decreasing returns to human capital
reproduces virtually every feature of the model outlined in previous sections, with the exception
that results that previously held for growth rates now hold for consumption levels.
214 The Nature and Timing of Mortality Changes
The model predicts that a Malthusian economy experiencing increases in life expectancy ((1−β)
or T) would go through an initial phase with consumption increasing, fertility possibly changing
in unpredictable ways — depending on the particular value of the parameters and the changes in T
and β— and population increasing rapidly.17 Population growth would be driven mainly by gains
in life expectancy. If these gains were large enough, individuals would start investing in human
capital and the economy would move to a new equilibrium, with the possibility of long run growth
(depending on the returns to human capital). From this point on, educational attainment would
rise with gains in adult longevity, and fertility would be reduced by either reductions in child
mortality or increases in adult longevity. Further increases in life expectancy would be associated
with further reductions in fertility, increases in human capital accumulation, and increases in the
growth rate (or consumption level).
For this theory to be empirically relevant, it must be the case that life expectancy gains actually
preceded fertility reductions in the real experiences of demographic transition. In addition, it must
also be the case that mortality reductions were somewhat exogenous to economic development, so
that they can be seen as an independent driving force.
The Nature of Mortality Changes
Figure 1 depicts evidence that a large fraction of the recent changes in life expectancy was
not determined by development. Preston (1975) presents similar evidence for the period between
1930 and 1960. Together, these data suggest that a large part of the mortality changes during
the twentieth century was unrelated to changes in income.18 Similar evidence is available for
the relation between life expectancy and nutrition. Preston (1980, p.305) presents data on life
expectancy at birth and nutrition for a cross-section of countries in 1940 and 1970. He shows
that life expectancy gains took place at every nutrition level. For the lowest nutrition group (less
than 2,100 calories daily), there was an increase of 10 years in life expectancy at birth. He also
17 At any point in time, population is an intricate function of adult longevity, and of the cumulative eﬀect of
past fertility and child mortality rates on initial population levels. If we normalize our model such that parents




















where s>T,a n dP0 is the initial population.
18 We do not claim that improvements in living conditions do not aﬀect life expectancy. This is, indeed, what
is behind the positive logarithmic relationship between life expectancy and income in Figure 1. Our claim is that
changes in life expectancy at birth from 40 to more than 70 years, like the ones experienced during the demographic
transition, are not entirely due to material improvements.
22relates life expectancy changes to both income and calories consumption in a regression setting,
and concludes that approximately 50% of the changes in life expectancy was due to ‘structural
factors,’ unrelated to economic development.
Further support to this idea is provided by the diseases responsible for mortality reductions
in diﬀerent countries. Preston (1980, p.300-313) argues that the role of economic development
in reducing mortality operated mostly through inﬂuenza/pneumonia/bronchitis, for which there
was no eﬀective deployment of preventive measures, and diarrheal diseases, for which the gains
came mainly through improvements in water supply and sewerage. Apart from these diseases,
preventive measures were the most eﬀective ones. Simple changes in public practices and personal
health behavior, brought about by knowledge previously inexistent or unavailable, allowed for
signiﬁcant reductions in mortality at very low costs (Preston, 1996, p.532-4).19 This view
generates numbers similar to the ones obtained in the income—nutrition—mortality analysis, with
a little more than 50% of life expectancy gains being unrelated to economic development per se.
The evidence discussed in Becker, Philipson and Soares (2003) also supports this view. They show
that reductions in mortality due to infectious, respiratory and digestive diseases, congenital and
perinatal conditions were the most important factors producing the convergence in life expectancy
observed between 1965 and 1995. This suggests that the large changes in mortality observed in
the developing world were due to the absorption of previously available knowledge and, in this
sense, were exogenous to these countries.
Lichtenberg (2003) presents a diﬀerent type of evidence that also supports the idea of exoge-
nous, technologically induced, reductions in mortality. He uses a cross-country panel to show
that launches of new drugs — associated with “new chemical entities” — explain 40% of the life
expectancy gains observed in 52 countries between 1986 and 2000. His estimates control for a
series of other determinants of life expectancy, such as education, income, nutrition, environment,
and lifestyle.
The Timing of Mortality Changes
The consensus in the demographic literature depicts mortality reductions starting the transition,
implying a period of intense population growth, which phases out as fertility declines. Initial
19 Most dramatically, the acceptance of the germ theory — developed on the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth
century — allowed for inexpensive gains in life expectancy via simple preventive measures (Vacher, 1979; Ram and
Schultz, 1979; Preston, 1980 and 1996; Ruzicka and Hansluwka, 1982). Also, throughout the twentieth century,
health programs became increasingly dissociate of the countries’ economic conditions, and more dependent on the
concerns of the developed world. Even though the monetary value of the help was relatively small, the larger
contributions came in the form of development of low cost health measures, training of personnel, initiation of
programs, and more eﬀective and speciﬁc interventions (see Preston, 1980, p.313-5; and Ruzicka and Hansluwka,
1982). To some extent, this helped to dissociate gains in life expectancy from improvements in economic conditions.
23economic conditions are extremely diverse in the diﬀerent experiences (see Heer and Smith, 1968;
Cassen, 1978; Kirk, 1996; Mason, 1997; and Macunovich, 2000). This is true both for the classic
histories of demographic transition — such as England or Sweden — and for the post-war experience
of Asian and Latin American countries. If we look at developing countries, we see modest longevity
gains without fertility reductions, but we do not see fertility reductions without life expectancy
gains (see Soares, 2002a). The features of the data are consistent with the theory. Initial gains in
life expectancy, while the economy is still in the Malthusian equilibrium, may have distinct eﬀects
on fertility. But further mortality reductions eventually move the economy out of this equilibrium.
Once this threshold is reached, fertility decreases with gains in life expectancy.
The model predicts that, conditional on the value of the parameters, diﬀerent combinations
of adult longevity and child mortality may move the economy out of the Malthusian equilibrium.
Generally, this does not give a single life expectancy number that characterizes the transition. This
is even truer once we realize that diﬀerent countries may have diﬀerent parameter values, due to
diﬀerences in cultures, institutions, etc. Nevertheless, the data seem consistent with the idea that
there may be a cut oﬀ level of life expectancy that determines the escape from the Malthusian
equilibrium. The evidence discussed above is consistent with a common threshold around 50 years
of life expectancy at birth. If this is the case, reaching this level of life expectancy would mark the
transition of a country from a Malthusian regime to an equilibrium with investments in human
capital and growth or, alternatively, higher level of long run consumption.
In Figures 6 and 7 we explore this point by analyzing the behavior of fertility and educational
attainment before and after the year when life expectancy at birth reaches 50 years. Every country
for which data is available that reaches this level of life expectancy within the interval 1960-95 is
included in the ﬁgures. Countries are aligned in time according to the year when the threshold
was reached, such that year T is the ‘year when life expectancy at birth reached 50.’ Other years
are measured as deviations from this reference point. This speciﬁc moment in time is obviously
not the precise point at which all the diﬀerent countries start their demographic transition. But
if it is a roughly reasonable approximation, and life expectancy is rising throughout the period,
fertility and educational attainment should show clear trends after year T, while there should be
no clear trend in either variable before year T.
Figure 6 shows the behavior of fertility before and after year T, measured as the deviation
of fertility from its initial transitional level. The pattern arises clearly. While fertility behaves
erratically before year T, it shows a clear downward trend for all countries after that point. Figure
7 does the same exercise for average schooling in the population aged 25 and above. The result
shows an analogous pattern: while educational attainment does not have any clear trend before
24year T, it shows a clear upward trend for all countries after that point. In both cases, it may be
argued that the transition point is actually slightly before year T, which would imply a cut oﬀ
between 45 and 50 years of life expectancy at birth. We do not argue against this possibility. As
mentioned before, the evidence should be seen just as suggestive that a level of life expectancy
at birth around 50 years is, on average, associated with changes in the demographic regime. The
particular point is likely to be country speciﬁc and to depend diﬀerentially on child mortality and
adult longevity. Further research is needed to pinpoint the precise timing of regime switch in each
experience of demographic transition.
The few African countries that have not yet started the transition — such as Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Congo — also support this interpretation. Even though most
of them experienced signiﬁcant life expectancy gains, the levels are still very low, usually below
50 years. In addition, there are no consistent reductions in fertility or increases in educational
attainment (Soares, 2002a).
Finally, the behavior of population in the second half of the twentieth century also supports the
theory. Heuveline (1999) uses counter factual projections of the behavior of mortality and fertility
between 1950 and 2000 to disentangle their eﬀects on the evolution of world population. He
extends the methodology applied by White and Preston (1996), by dividing the world into regions
and projecting four counter factual scenarios for each of them. The projections are obtained by
applying age and sex speciﬁc survival rates to initial populations, and by applying age speciﬁc
fertility rates to initial female populations. His analysis shows that mortality reductions of the
second half of the twentieth century contributed to increase the world population by 33%, while
fertility changes reduced it by 26%. Interestingly, had the fertility and mortality levels remained
at their 1950 values, the world population today would be virtually the same as it is. Contrary to
common belief in the economics profession, the population explosion of the twentieth century was
caused almost entirely by gains in life expectancy, with fertility changes working to slow down the
process.
Other Evidence
Speciﬁc predictions of the model are also in line with a vast array of evidence from studies that
try to estimate the economic impact of life expectancy gains. Most notoriously, these include the
positive eﬀect of life expectancy on growth in the empirical growth literature, summarized and
discussed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Other examples are the case study for India of the
eﬀects of life expectancy gains on schooling and productivity (Ram and Schultz, 1979), and the
simulation exercises performed by Bils and Klenow (2000), analyzing the role of life expectancy
25in explaining cross-country diﬀerences in schooling, productivity, and fertility.
Additionally, Soares (2002a) shows that, even though issues of causality are a concern, the
correlations between adult longevity, child mortality, fertility, and educational attainment implied
by the theory are present in cross-country panel data (after controlling for country and time ﬁxed
eﬀects, and development level). In the same direction, Kalemli-Ozcan (2001) shows that the spread
of AIDS in Africa, which was associated mostly with increases in young adult mortality, had a
positive impact on fertility (after controlling for female schooling, urbanization, infant mortality,
income per capita, and time and country ﬁxed eﬀects). Finally, Soares (2002b) argues that these
same correlations can be detected at the micro level. He uses family speciﬁc mortality indicators
and micro data from Brazil to show that adult longevity is positively related to educational
attainment and negatively related to fertility, after child mortality and a large set of demographic
v a r i a b l e si sa c c o u n t e df o r .
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper explores the link between life expectancy, educational attainment, and fertility choice.
We show that, under reasonable conditions, mortality reductions can explain the movement of
economies from a Malthusian equilibrium, with no investments in human capital, to a steady-
state with the possibility of growth. Further reductions in mortality in this steady-state with
growth reduce fertility, increase educational attainment, and, thus, increase the growth rate of the
economy. These features of the model help explain the demographic transition throughout the
world and the recent behavior of fertility in post-demographic transition countries.
Two aspects of the model drive these eﬀects, and distinguish our theoretical work from the
previous literature. The utility that parents derive from each child is assumed to depend on the
number of children, on child mortality, and, additionally, on the lifetime that each child will enjoy
as an adult. The way number of children and lifetime of each child interact in the parent’s utility
function is an important force behind the mechanics of the model.
In addition, human capital investments are broken down in two pieces: basic investments, that
take place during childhood and are done by parents; and adult investments, that take place during
adulthood and are done by the individuals themselves. We interpret educational attainment as
the time that adult individuals spend on their own education. Apart from being more realistic,
this approach allows the model to distinguish between the eﬀects of adult longevity and child
mortality on investments in education and growth, and stresses the sequential nature of human
capital investments.
Through these two channels, gains in adult longevity can move an economy out of a steady
26state without growth and with no investments in human capital (Malthusian equilibrium) into an
equilibrium with growth. Also, increases in adult longevity in the equilibrium with growth reduce
fertility, increase educational attainment, and increase the growth rate of the economy. Child
mortality reductions may have similar eﬀects.
The possibility of long run growth rests on the assumption of constant returns to human
capital, but the behavior of the demographic variables does not depend on this assumption. We
show that, under decreasing returns to human capital, most of the implications of the model hold,
and the results that previously held for growth rates in this case apply to long run consumption.
We justify the exogenous role played by life expectancy by arguing that a large share of the
changes in this variable during the last century were unrelated to economic development. We
also discuss other sets of evidence showing that the chronology of events during demographic
transitions, and the behavior of fertility and educational attainment, seem to agree with the
predictions of the model.
The theory supports the idea that gains in life expectancy are a major force determining the
onset of the demographic transition. Also, it suggests that life expectancy changes may be relevant
in determining the behavior of the economy after the transition. In particular, adult longevity
— a variable largely overlooked in both demographic and economic literature — is a potentially
important factor determining fertility and educational choices.
A Appendix
A.1 The Eﬀect of T on c and b in an Equilibrium with Growth
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dT may be negative, but both cannot be negative at the same time. If one is
negative, the other must be positive.
A.2 The Possibility of a Steady-State
The possibility of a steady-state in this economy rests on the values of the parameters α and σ.
Technological factors summarized by the goods constraint imply that, in any steady-state, c and
hp must necessarily grow at the same constant rate from one generation to the next. But the
individual maximization problem tells us, through equation 14, that c and hp growing at the same
rate will not be consistent with the optimal choices of the diﬀerent generations, unless α = σ.
Therefore, for a steady-state to exist in this economy, it must be the case that α = σ,s ot h a t
individuals from diﬀerent generations will make optimal choices such that c and hp will grow at
the same constant rate, and b, n, e,a n dl will be constant.
This can be formally seen once we realize that, in terms of the individual’s problem, for a
steady-state to exist it must be the case that agents will not change their decisions regarding n,
b, l,a n de as hp increases. This means that the diﬀerent generations, who diﬀer only in terms of
28their endowed hp and see it as a given parameter, will translate the higher levels of basic human
capital in increased consumption, leaving b, n, e,a n dl unchanged.
From the results obtained before, we already know that dn
dhp = de
dhp =0 .W ec a nu s ee q u a t i o n s
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> 0,
where the sign of dc
dhp comes from the fact that σ < 1.
As mentioned before, a steady-state requires a constant b with an increasing hp. This will only
happen here if σ = α, in which case we have db
dhp =0a n d dc
dhp = A
T e(e−bn). It is immediate to see
that, in this case, c and hp will grow at the same constant rate, given by (1 + γ)=hc
hp = DAbe.
If σ 6= α, there is no steady-state, and b will increase or decrease over time (with the increase
in hp) until a corner solution is reached. Rewrite db






(σ − α)(e − bn)
[(σ − α)bn +( α − 1)e]
.
So, if α > σ,w eh a v e db
dhp > 0; and if α < σ,w eh a v e db
dhp < 0, since σ < 1.
The intuition for this result is clear. If α > σ, the sub-utility function related to hc is less
concave than the one related to c, such that when hp grows from one generation to the next,
younger generations tend to increase hc more than proportionately to c, and this is achieved
through increases in b. The same sort of argument works for the case where α < σ,i m p l y i n gt h a t
hc is increased less than proportionately to c, and that this is achieved through reductions in b.
When α = σ, every generation is just happy to increase c and hp in the same proportion in relation
to the previous generation, in which case b remains unchanged and we have a steady-state.
A.3 The Escape from the Malthusian Equilibrium
A.3.1 T and the Escape from the Malthusian Steady-State
This section of the Appendix discusses what happens to the two last ﬁrst order conditions in the
Malthusian equilibrium as T increases. We start by analyzing the steady-state where investment
in both forms of human capital is zero, and show that, as T increases, an interior solution tends
to be achieved in both b and e. We then show that, when an interior solution is actually achieved
in one of these variables, further increases in T still tend to break the remaining inequality (e>0
and b =0 ,o rb>0a n de =0 ) .
29i) e =0and b =0
The last two foc’s can be rewritten as TAho/Ho < 1a n dε(n,T,β)=ρnn/ρ > αDf/ho.
So, suﬃciently large increases in T can always break the ﬁrst inequality, making e>0.
Since we assume that consumption is low (Ho not too big) in the Malthusian equilibrium,
we have dn/dT > 0. This means that the value of ρ increases as T rises, so that the elasticity
ε is reduced, and the second inequality may be broken. This will be the case only if ε is not
bounded from below above αDf/ho. In this case, starting from e = b = 0, exogenous gains in
adult longevity will tend to eliminate the corner solutions on both e and b.
ii) e>0 and b =0
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with the constraint T − e =
Tc+fn
Aeho+Ho.
The constraint together with the last foc gives e = T
2 − Ho
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For the same reasons discussed before, at low levels of consumption we have dn/dT > 0. The
corner solution on n can be characterized by the same expression ε(n,T,β) >
αDf
ho . Again as
before, as the value of ρ increases as T rises, the elasticity ε is reduced, and the inequality may
be broken.
iii) b>0 and e =0












and the constraint is T = bn+
Tc+fn
Ho . Using the foc’s and the constraint have the same inequality
of the ﬁrst case: TAh o/Ho < 1. As T increases, an internal solution on e tends to be achieved.
30A.3.2 β and the Escape from the Malthusian Steady-State
Starting from a position where e = b =0 ,c h a n g e si nβ do not aﬀect the foc related to e.T h e
























T (σ − 1)cσ−2 ≷ 0.
The realistic case is the one where reductions in child mortality lead unequivocally to increased
utility from children. If this is the case, the expression above is positive. This is true if the sub-
stitutability between survival rates and number of children is not too strong (ρnβ quantitatively
small when compared to ρnn). It is also likely to happen when consumption is low in the Malthu-
sian equilibrium (Ho relatively small). In both scenarios, the positive terms in the numerator
dominate, so that dρ/dβ < 0( r e m e m b e rt h a tρβ < 0). Reductions in child mortality increase the
value of ρ,r e d u c i n gε, and increasing the return to investments in basic human capital, possibly
breaking the corner solution ε > αDf/ho.
So, diﬀerently from increases in adult longevity, reductions in child mortality tend unequivo-
cally to move the economy to a transitional situation where b>0a n de =0 . I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e
corner solution in e is still characterized by the same inequality as before, just substituting ho by
hp: TAh p <H o.F o r t h e ﬁrst generation of parents experiencing reductions in their children’s
mortality, hp = ho, and there is no tendency to break the corner solution on e.B u ta sc h i l d r e n
who receive positive investments in basic human capital become adults, their hp in period t is
hp,t = hc,t−1 >h o. If child mortality is consistently reduced one generation after another — such
that hp,t+1 >h p,t >h p,t−1 — the inequality TAhp <H o is eventually be broken, and the economy
reaches a steady-state with growth and positive investments in all forms of human capital.
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Figure 7: Schooling Deviation from Initial Transitional Level Before and After the Year when 
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